written by Jennifer McLawhorn, Editor-in-Chief
The collision between Amtrak train 531 and the UP RMM occurred as the RMM was moving from main track 1 across main track 2, which was occupied by train 531.
Courtesy of NTSB
OAKLAND, Calif. – The NTSB released a railroad investigation report following a collision between Amtrak train 531 and a Union Pacific road maintenance machine last July.
In July 2022, Amtrak train 531 (a train with one lead locomotive, four coach cars, and one car) collided with a Union Pacific Road Maintenance Machine (RMM) while crossing the DOR 749716B to Oakland, California en route. in San Jose Now, the NTSB has released a railroad investigation report (RIR-23-11). The report shows that the RMM, a piece of equipment used to lift and move material, was busy at the time of the collision, and the worker suffered serious injuries. A passenger and two train crew members aboard the Amtrak train had minor injuries.
According to the report, “the collision occurred when the RMM was moving from main track 1 across main track 2, which was occupied by train 531,” as shown in the photo above. Damage to equipment is estimated at $92,000 and $216,000 for Amtrak and UP, respectively. The RMM “was a Speed-Swing Model No. 445E manufactured by Pettibone and owned and operated by UP as Speed-Swing No. SS007; it was a tall rail vehicle capable of operating over roads and railroad tracks.” In July 2022, the RMM was used by a group assigned to the Alameda County Regional Auto Theft Task Force, and there was a “sole operator on board.” . . Two other UP staff members, a road worker in charge (RWIC) and a backhoe operator, were also part of the road task force.”
The track near the collision was owned by Union Pacific and the maximum speed for passenger trains in that area was 79 miles per hour. Class 1 “authorizes train movements through the area with a system of traffic control signals, [and] Train movements were coordinated by a UP dispatcher at UP’s dispatch center in Omaha, Nebraska.” At the time of the collision, the track was equipped with a PTC system that was “enabled and operational at the time of the collision”.
The crossing was “active” as it had active warning devices to indicate an approaching train. The warning devices “consisted of two sets of pole-mounted flashing lights and two doors (one door and one set of lights for each direction of road approach).”
An interview with an engineer showed that the Amtrak train was ¾ of a mile from the Main Track 2 crossing, and the engineer “observed the RMM on Main Track 1.” According to the report, “the engineer said that the RMM appeared to be stopped and that he routinely saw equipment stopped on the adjacent tracks. According to event recorder data, the engineer began a horn sequence at 11:01:02 a.m. while he was about 1,440 feet from the crossing and traveling at 73 mph.” A review of the electronic records of ‘crossing revealed that the RMM operator had “already raised the RMM’s rail gear wheels”. In addition, data from the “forward looking locomotive image recorder showed the RMM stationary on the track main 1; the RMM was facing away from the train with the wheels parallel to the track.” In the same minute, the RMM moved and began to turn towards main track 2. The locomotive’s forward facing imager shows that the crossing gates were down and the lights were flashing.
After the last part of the horn sequence and an emergency brake attempt, the “train struck the RMM at 11:01:16 at 68 mph and continued to move through the crossing.” The engineer reported that the impact jolted the locomotive and prevented him from immediately moving the brake lever to the emergency position. Emergency brake application began at 11:01:19 and the “train came to a head-on stop about 1,600 feet after the crossing.” Emergency services showed up about 5 minutes later.
The photos below show the damage to both RMM and Amtrak train 531 after the collision.
In Section 1.3 Post-Collision Inspections, the NTSB details its (and the FRA’s) inspections of the crossing warning system, as well as the testing of train 531’s air brakes, the horn, the locomotive’s bell and headlights. Inspections showed that there were no identifiable problems with system operation at the crossing and that the train’s systems were not too badly damaged “to prevent the tests from operating as designed”.
NTSB’s analysis of the RIR shows that the RMM operator was unaware of the oncoming train, as evidenced by toxicology tests. Additionally, “the most recent training received by the RMM operator did not specifically address the safe operation of RMMs over the track at highway and railroad level crossings, and the RMM operator’s decision to cross the track main 2 despite the sound of the locomotive horn and a clear line. The view of the approaching train suggests that the RMM operator did not look or hear the trains before moving the RMM off the protected track.”
As a result, Union Pacific has revised its RMM operator training to “include instructions on how to safely exit highway and railroad grade crossings when warning devices are activated or not present.” The training will also instruct operators to exit the crossing “without polluting the adjacent roadway when possible and, when fouling of a roadway is unavoidable, turn off audible distractions such as AM/FM radios, roll down a window to listen trains or other equipment”. and proceed only after confirming that there is sufficient sight distance to complete the move safely.”
In determining the probable cause of the collision, the NTSB reported that the collision between UP RMM and Amtrak train 531 was “the operator of the road maintenance machine traveling through unknown reasons onto an unprotected track and into the path of an oncoming train.”
The National Transportation Safety Board’s railroad investigation report can be read in its entirety here.
